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Abstract 
Development aid is frequently considered as an important engine for economic 
growth. Recently, it has been acknowledged that long-term growth should also be 
based on domestic tax-raising. Therefore, attention is given to the relationship 
between aid and taxation. Two opposing hypothesis are outlined, where aid either 
reduces incentives for internal tax-raising (crowding out) or might stimulate 
domestic taxation (crowding in). Empirical evidence is until now rather inconclusive 
and contradictory with respect to the effects of development aid on taxation. Only 
few comprehensive panel studies are available using aggregate data. 
 This article provides a innovative analytical framework for understanding the 
tax-aid relationship, introducing more disaggregation between sources of aid 
(bi/multilateral ad; grants/loans) and types of taxation (direct/indirect). We 
composed a new data set comprising 108 DAC countries for the period 1990-2007. 
Instead of focusing on aggregate economic growth, the analysis addresses the 
effects of aid on the tax share in gross domestic expenditures. This permits us to 
identify possible implications of development aid for changes in funding of public 
programs.  
 We find a robust and significant relationship between (lagged) aid and tax 
revenues, which is stronger for bilateral aid (compared to multilateral aid), for 
grants (compared to loans) and for middle income countries. Moreover, a structural 
break was detected at the end of the 1990s, indicating the likely effect of the 
introduction of budgetary support programs for stimulating local tax-raising. 
 
Keywords: Direct and Indirect Taxation; Development Assistance; Multilateral & Bilateral Aid; 
Loans & Grants; Cross-country Analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Developing countries are usually characterized by limited contributions of domestic taxation 
to public finance, and consequently a relatively large share of gross national expenditures is 
funded through external loans or grants. Similarly, tax revenues as percentage of GDP are 
typically much lower in developing countries compared to rich countries.1 Tax regimes and 
fiscal regulations widely vary within and between developed and developing countries, with 
the latter facing reduced options for direct (income, corporate and property) taxes 
(Musgrave, 1990; Kelly, 2000). Consequently, indirect taxes still represent the major share of 
fiscal income in most developing countries. 
While it is generally believed that developing countries should raise their internal sources of 
finance through more rigorous tax-raising, little attention is given to the role of foreign aid 
in promoting better tax regimes or higher tax discipline. Most available studies refer to 
individual countries or sub-regions and cover limited time periods (Feeny, 2007; Fjeldstad 
and Rakner, 2003). The scarce comprehensive studies that address the aid and taxation 
relationship that rely on larger samples (Gambaro et al., 2007, Gupta et al., 2003) show 
inconclusive, contradictory and sometime arguable conclusions on the effect of development 
aid on taxation in developing countries. This may be partly due to reliance on different 
estimation methods  (i.e. structural equation modeling, panel designs, 2SLS) , but it also 
reflects difficulties in applying adequate contextual control variables that explain part of the 
observed heterogeneity.  
Reviewing the scarcely available evidence, the relationship between international aid and 
domestic taxation is found to be either positive (Gambaro et al, 2007; Khan & Hoshino, 
1992) or negative (Gupta et al., 2003), or even insignificant (McGillivray, 1994). Positive 
effects of aid on taxation are expected when complementarities can be reached, arguing that 
increased public expenditures will enhance economic growth and thus reinforce the tax base 
according to traditional Keynesian principles. The underlying hypotheses for the inverse 
effect argues that development aid might  reduce the incentives for national tax-raising, 
commonly referred to as the 'crowding-out' effect (Heijdra et al., 1998; Andreoni, 1993).  
A comparison of these studies indicates that disaggregation is of primary importance, 
making differences both for aid (e.g. from bilateral or multilateral sources, between grants 
and loans) and for taxation (direct/indirect). Moreover, a general shortcoming in the 
literature is the lack of empirical tests of variables that are likely to mediate the relationship 
between aid and taxation. Factors like the structure of the domestic economy (e.g. 
agriculture or industry-based), the degree of openness (tax revenues from exports and 
imports), the population structure (urbanization) and the political regime (good governance, 
rule of law) are commonly believed to influence tax raising opportunities.  
                                               
1 Tanzi and Zee (2000) report that the tax revenue-GDP ratio for developing countries was 18.2 
compared to 37.9% for OECD countries during the 1995-97 period. 
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This article tries to overcome some of the observed deficiencies and difficulties, developing 
an entire new and comprehensive dataset on development aid disbursements and tax-
raising in 77 developing countries. We introduced substantial differentiation in types of aid 
and categories of taxation, and furthermore incorporated included structural variables for 
the character of the domestic economy and the degree of development as appropriate 
controls. Furthermore, the time span of our analysis covers 17 years, substantially larger 
than earlier studies. This enables us also to identify possible break-points related to periods 
where international attention was first focused on trade liberalization and Structural 
Adjustment (late 1980s/early 1990s) and subsequently attention shifted to Debt 
Restructuring and Budgetary Support (late 1990s). 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a concise overview 
of the current literature on tax and aid linkages, identifying some of the underlying causal 
mechanisms that foster development. In Section 3 we present an outline of the new database 
composed for this research, and we discuss the analytical procedures to guarantee unbiased 
results. Section 4 reports on the different estimations made and discusses our main 
findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes with some major implications for research and policy.  
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2. International Aid, Domestic Taxation and Development 
 
The development literature describes the effect of international aid on domestic taxation 
usually within the framework of fungibility (Swaroop & Deverajan, 1998). This implies that 
aid disbursements cannot be fully traced towards their final allocation, and therefore more 
attention should be given to the global effects of aid on stimulating economic growth and 
public governance. Recognition of the difficulties of directing aid to specific purposes (aid 
conditionality) paved the way for a set of new policies for international cooperation. The 
most important shift during the late 1990s was the adoption by major donor countries of 
so-called coordinated sector-wide programs and the shift from project support to global 
budget support. 
The relationship between international aid and domestic taxation has been subject to wide 
controversies. According to some authors, aid could be used to increase institutional 
capabilities and strengthen the fiscal administration and might thus have as result an 
increase in tax revenues. Others argue, however, that aid might be easily used to substitute 
for tax revenues or might be captured by influential groups, thus contributing to less 
productive public expenditures. In the latter situation we might expect stable or even 
declining tax revenues as a result of aid disbursements. 
The scarce empirical studies on tax-aid linkages rely on (a) different hypotheses regarding 
the underlying factors influencing tax-raising capacities in developing countries, and (b) 
different empirical methods used for specifying and estimating the tax-aid relationship. We 
discuss both aspects. 
 2.1. Analytical Approaches 
Early studies on the effects of aid on domestic taxation are mostly limited to specific 
countries or sub-regions, and yields mixed and inconclusive results.2 The first 
comprehensive analysis of the tax-aid relationship presented by Gupta et al. (2003) covered 
107 countries over the period 1970-2000.  The study investigates whether the impact of aid 
on the revenue effort depends on the composition of aid (grants vis-à-vis loans). The results 
indicate that while concessional loans are associated with higher domestic revenue 
mobilization, the opposite is true of grants. On average, the dampening effect of grants on 
the revenue effort is modest. However, for those countries plagued by high levels of 
                                               
2 For example, Pack and Pack (1990) find foreign aid had a positive effect on domestic revenues in 
Indonesia, while Franco-Rodriguez and Morrissey (1998) find a negative relationship in Pakistan. 
McGillivray and Ahmed (1999) find that aid depressed tax revenues in the Philippines during the period 
of 1960-92. The results from the Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) study suggest that aid has had a 
positive impact on revenue mobilization among African countries and a negative impact on non-
African countries. Heller (1975) found a negative effect of aid on revenue for 11 African countries. 
 
 
8 
corruption, results suggest that the decline in revenues completely offsets the increase in 
grants. 
Gambaro et al. (2007) study the relationship between development aid inflows and tax 
revenues for a sample of 65 countries over the period of 1990 to 2004. Their results do not 
support the hypothesis that aid substitutes for domestic tax revenue. On the contrary, the 
study finds evidence that there is a positive association between aid inflows and tax revenue, 
which is primarily driven by the positive relationship between grants and taxation. No 
evidence is found for the hypothesis that the marginal impact of aid on tax revenue is 
different in countries with low corruption compared to more strongly corrupted countries. At 
more disaggregated level a heterogeneous association of aid with different components of 
tax revenue is identified. The possible two-way relationship between tax revenue and 
institutions is also acknowledged. 
Further research has been mainly focused on the analysis of specific factors that mediate the 
aid-tax relationship. While Gambaro et al. (2007) show that the poverty level of a country 
significantly influences the degree of taxation, Cobham (2005) further elaborate that 
countries classified according to degrees of poverty and inequality significantly differ in their 
tax structure. Over the last thirty years, rich countries have generally maintained or extended 
their overall tax rate (as a share of gross domestic product) by increasing both direct (e.g. 
income tax) and indirect taxes. Poorer region have also sought to increase tax revenues, 
starting from a much lower base. There has been little positive contribution from direct tax, 
and the pressure for trade liberalization has meant that this important source of indirect 
taxation has generally decreased. This has led to a general trend of increasing reliance on tax 
based on sales of goods and services. Low-income countries, notably in sub-Saharan Africa 
and South Asia, face overwhelming difficulties in regard to both the level and the stability of 
tax revenues. 
Other relevant mediating variables refer to the influence of the internal economic and 
demographic structure on tax-raising capacity. Gambaro et al. (2007) argue that a large 
agriculture sector is detrimental for tax revenues since farmers are hard to tax directly and a 
large share of agricultural activity is normally directed towards subsistence. In a similar vein, 
Cobham (2005) argues that countries with large amounts of mineral resources generally 
depend less on domestic taxation. In more general terms, the degree of openness of the 
economy (i.e. exports and imports as GDP share) is used to assess the impact of trade on tax 
regimes. It is sometimes expected that more open economies are better able to raise taxes 
and that aid programs contributing to intensifying foreign trade can be beneficial for tax-
raising. However, Agbeyegbe et al. (2004) present evidence that trade liberalization is not 
strongly linked to aggregate tax revenues, but does contribute to higher income tax revenue. 
Finally, several studies rely on political and institutional variables to explain the linkages 
between aid and taxation. Adam and O’Connell (1999) use the Polity IV indicators that 
classify countries on a continuum from fully autocratic to fully democratic governance. They 
argue that the quality of government has a decisive impact on the way that tax policies are 
defined and implemented and how tax revenues are used. It is expected that in countries 
with more democratic governance, any increase in aid has more prospects to be associated 
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with a corresponding increase in tax revenues. Other studies use the Kaufman dimensions of 
governance to assess the role of institutional quality on the effectiveness of aid (Moore, 
2007;  
Fjeldstad and Rakner, 2003). Given the relatively short time-span in the availability of these 
indicators, this proves to be difficult to use in panel data analyses. It is generally expected 
that countries with better levels of governance are able to generate more foreign aid, which 
consequently could increase their domestic tax base. Otherwise, good governance is 
supposed to be associated with better domestic tax-raising capacities. Therefore, the 
causality of the relationship between governance and taxation is still subject to a wide 
debate.3 
2.2  Methodological Approaches 
The analysis of aid-tax relationships can be specified in a number of different ways and 
outcomes are highly sensitive for the methodological approaches applied for estimating 
mutual interactions. In general, outcomes depend on (a) the time period used, (b) the degree 
of (dis)aggregation of aid and tax data, and (c) the type of control variables applied. 
The different outcomes regarding the aid-tax relationship in the studies conducted by 
Gambaro et al. (2007) compared to the results by Gupta et al. (2003) can largely be 
explained by the time span investigated. The former study finds a positive association 
between aid inflows and tax revenues for the period 1990-2004 characterized by more 
focused development aid toward strengthening institutional and administrative capacity of 
the development countries. Therefore, development aid became more directed to 
strengthening of institutional capacity that fundamentally changed the response of tax 
revenues. The latter study examines the revenue response to inflows of foreign aid during 
the 1970-2000 period and supports the hypothesis that aid substitutes for domestic tax 
revenues. This is certainly the case for the early periods of development cooperation where 
grants were more important than concessional loans. We included therefore in our estimates 
lagged variables for aid to account for some delayed effects on the domestic economy. This 
proved to be an important innovation, since it permits to identify the medium-term effects 
of aid on domestic taxation regimes. 
Earlier studies rely on rather different procedures for the disaggregation of aid and taxes. 
Gupta et al. (2003) distinguish between grants and loans, and find that concessional loans 
are associated with higher domestic revenue mobilization, while grants show a dampening 
effect.  
Khan and Hoshino (1992) further differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid. On the 
other hand, Gambaro et al. (2007) differentiate between income and capital taxes, sales tax 
                                               
3 Gambaro et al. (2007) register, however, large heterogeneity in the relationship between taxation and 
institutional development. While income and sales taxes are positively associated, export taxes have a 
negative relationship with governance.  This suggests that countries with higher average revenue from 
trade taxes are systematically weaker in several aspects of administrative effectiveness. 
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and taxes on trade, finding that aid grants – but not loans - have a positive effect on sales 
and trade taxes whereas there is a negative association with income taxes. It should be 
noted that the net effect from income taxation in developing countries is only 4.4% of GDP, 
which is very low compared to an average income and capital tax revenue of around 12.5-
13% of GDP in OECD countries. In this study, we disaggregated aid according to type (i.e. 
grants and loans) and origin (bilateral and multilateral aid). 
Finally, the statistical procedures used for estimating the aid-tax relationship might 
influence outcomes. Most importantly, adequate contextual variables should be used to 
guarantee un-biased estimates. We included country openness and the development level as 
main control variables. Most studies draw on dynamic panel data analyses and OLS methods, 
distinguishing between fixed and random effects estimates. Feeny (2007) applied structural 
equation modeling to assess fiscal response to foreign aid. Agbeyegbe et al. (2004) perform 
GMM regressions to test the relationship between trade liberalization, exchange rates, and 
tax revenues. Following the main literature, this article relies on dynamic panel estimates 
with country-specific effects and lagged values for aid that provides efficient and consistent 
estimates of the coefficient at robust standard errors.  
The data analysis for this article differs from earlier studies in three aspects. First, we cover a 
longer time period (till 2007) and are thus able to capture specific changes related to new 
aid modalities implemented from early 2000.In addition, we included interaction effects 
between aid and time to account for effects of aid on the growth rate of taxation. The 
turning point from conditional structural adjustment loans to budgetary support programs 
precisely takes place in the period under review. Second, we included development aid as a 
lagged variable, thus capturing better the time-lag between aid disbursements and 
corresponding tax implications. Third, we conducted more disaggregated analyses of aid 
and taxation for different time periods and country categories to maintain insight in the 
specificities of the incidence of development aid on domestic tax-raising capacities.  
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3. Data and Approach 
We composed a database of tax raising revenues for 77 developing countries and clustered 
the data by six geographic regions (South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, and East Asia & Pacific) and by development 
status (e.g. least developed, low income, lower middle income and upper middle income). 
Difference was made between revenues from direct and indirect taxation. The data set 
covers the time period 1990-2007.4 In addition, we collected data on development aid by 
OECD-DAC donors over the same period, making distinction between bilateral and 
multilateral aid, and between loans and grants. Annex 1 provides a list of all variables used 
in the analyses. 
The dataset is further enriched by including relevant parameters regarding the internal 
socio-economic and political development in the recipient countries. Therefore, we included 
time-series data on gross national expenditures, GDP per capita, income distribution (Gini), 
foreign trade dependency (exports and imports as share of GDP), and structure of the 
economy (ratio of value added in agriculture and industry; mineral richness).5   
The main dependent variable for our analysis is the contribution of domestic tax revenues 
for covering gross national expenditures (GNE). This is considered as a key indicator for the 
role of tax raising in financing public development programs and policies. Development aid 
per capita is used a the main independent variable (further disaggregated according to 
sources and types), whereas country characteristics are added to control for structural 
differences.  
The data analysis consists of an explorative analysis (without imputations for missing cases) 
to outline the structure and characteristics of the data base, followed by a panel data 
analysis (using imputations for missing data) with fixed effects and time- and country 
dummies to determine the relationships between taxation and aid. We start with a short 
descriptive analysis of the composition of the data set and a graphical presentation of tax 
and aid tendencies at country and sub-regional level. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. On average, taxes cover about 14 % of gross national 
expenditures, but variation is between 2% and 36 %. The contribution of indirect taxes is 
slightly higher than from direct taxation. Aid per capita is about US$ 35, composed of 63 % 
bilateral aid (= 37 % multilateral aid) and 73% grants (= 27 % loans). 
                                               
4 The original data set included 108 countries. Following indications from Singer and Willet (2003) the 
initial strategy for exploratory analyses only used those countries that have valid entries for the 
dependent variables collected in at least three time points. 
5 We also considered using policy indicators, like the Kaufman dimensions of governance, the Polity IV 
indicators of democracy, and Business Climate indicators, but time series proved to be too short for 
using in a dynamic panel approach. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Total tax revenues as % gross national expenditures 812.00 2.45 46.06 14.11 6.13 
Indirect taxes as % gross national expenditures 800.00 0.26 38.19 5.90 3.83 
Direct tax as % gross national expenditures 803.00 0.22 37.97 4.17 3.81 
 
Bilateral aid per capita all DAC countries one year lagged 808.00 0.43 231.63 25.99 29.23 
Bilateral aid per capita all DAC countries 2 years lagged 808.00 0.40 177.40 25.86 27.55 
Bilateral aid per capita all DAC countries 3 years lagged 808.00 0.40 145.40 25.70 26.62 
Multilateral aid per capita all DAC countries 1 year lagged 808.00 -13.90 296.45 15.10 25.69 
Multilateral aid per capita all DAC countries 2 years lagged 808.00 -6.28 177.77 14.09 18.86 
Multilateral aid per capita all DAC countries 3 years lagged 808.00 -3.60 138.99 13.65 16.95 
 
total donors total aid per capita lagged 1 year 809.00 -21.62 279.49 34.84 39.18 
total donors total aid per capita lagged 2 years average 810.00 -16.29 271.67 34.62 37.65 
total donors total aid per capita lagged 3 years average 810.00 -9.29 215.23 34.55 37.07 
total donors total grants per capita lagged 1 year 809.00 0.00 389.41 29.83 39.28 
total donors total grants per capita lagged 2 years average 810.00 0.00 278.44 28.70 34.10 
total donors total grants per capita lagged 3 years average 810.00 0.00 215.54 28.20 32.50 
Total donors total loans per capita lagged 1 year 809.00 -267.49 162.88 5.01 22.00 
Total donors total loans per capita lagged 2 years average 810.00 -166.66 94.93 5.92 15.33 
Total donors total loans per capita lagged 3 years average 810.00 -107.60 77.93 6.34 12.93 
 
EU donors total aid per capita lagged 1 year 808.00 -1.78 132.32 11.72 14.86 
EU donors total aid per capita lagged 2 years average 808.00 -0.43 103.10 11.64 14.13 
EU donors total aid per capita lagged 3 years average 808.00 -1.50 88.39 11.60 13.83 
EU donors total grants per capita lagged 1 year 808.00 0.03 162.59 11.04 14.62 
EU donors total grants per capita lagged 2 years average 808.00 0.03 118.78 10.92 13.73 
EU donors total grants per capita lagged 3 years average 808.00 0.03 98.70 10.83 13.36 
EU donors total loans per capita lagged 1 year 808.00 -33.27 29.35 0.68 4.42 
EU donors total loans per capita lagged 2 years average 808.00 -18.84 27.18 0.72 3.67 
EU donors total loans per capita lagged 3 years average 808.00 -13.38 23.69 0.77 3.30 
Valid N (listwise) 770.00         
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Closer inspection of the development of tax-raising over time indicates that during the 
period 1990-2007, on average taxes raised their contribution to GNE from 13.8 to 16.4 % 
(see Figure 1a). However, a major share of this growth can be attributed to indirect taxation 
that increased from 4.2% to 8.2% of GNE, whereas revenue shares from direct taxes remained 
largely unchanged. Figures 1b and 1c further illustrate these tendencies. 
More detailed overviews of the taxation rates and tax revenue shares in GDP by country and 
region are presented in Annex 2 and 3 respectively. Substantial heterogeneity appears be-
tween countries (see also Table 2), but some general regional trends can be discerned. Taxes 
in East Asia and Latin America are generally higher and show a slight linear rising trend, 
whereas South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa maintain lower tax rates and more varied growth 
patterns. 
 
Figure 1a: Tax revenues as share of Gross National Expenditures 
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Figure 1b: Direct Taxes as % GNE             Figure 1c: Indirect Taxes as % GNE 
       
 
 
 
Table 2: Tax revenues by region (as % of GDP) 
Total tax Direct tax Indirect tax  
Min Max Min Max Min Max 
East Asia & Pacific 2.0 25.3 5.7 61.8 9.0 79.5 
Central Asia 6.8 29.4 4.2 40.7 6.3 59.8 
South Asia 4.4 19.2 1.6 51.3 21.0 62.8 
Middle East & N. Africa 4.1 36.9 5.4 79.5 0.7 64.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 58.4 3.3 53.1 1.8 50.4 
Latin America & Caribbean 6.8 27.7 5.4 63.9 3.2 62.8 
 
We finally explored the main tendencies in the development of taxation over time (see Figure 
2). Therefore, for each country a simple linear regression was conducted, with tax income as 
dependent variable and time as independent variable. The coefficients for the intercept and 
the slope represent unbiased estimates of the initial status and the rate of change in 
taxation due to aid allocations. This provides us with some indicative measures of the 
average tax (direct, indirect and total) rates, as well as the standard deviations (e.g. observed 
heterogeneity between countries) and the rhythm of growth over time. Results are present in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3: Changes in Taxation over Time (as % of GDP) 
 Initial status (intercept) Rate of change (slope) 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Bivariate 
Correlation 
Total tax 11.81 7.91 0.24 0.74 -.490 ** 
Direct tax 17.03 20.04 0.14 1.40 -.843** 
Indirect tax 29.16 20.83 0.24 1.50 -.739** 
 
On average, the initial tax rate in the sample was 11.8 % in 1990 and increased with 0.24 % 
every year. The (negative) correlation of -.49 indicates that countries with a higher initial tax 
rate have a slower increase compared to countries with lower starting values that tend to 
increase their tax revenues more strongly. In a similar vein, average direct tax represented 
17 % of GDP in the base year 1990 and increases with 0.14% yearly. Indirect tax rates were 
substantially higher (29.2 % of GDP) and also increase much faster (yearly with 0.24 %).  
 
Figure 2: Tax Revenues as % of Gross National Expenditures (1990-2007) 
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4. Results 
 
We relied on balanced panel regression analysis to understand the relationship between 
taxation and aid disbursements. Therefore, we used tax revenues (expressed as a 
percentage of gross national expenditures) as dependent variable. Taxes are also 
disaggregated into direct and indirect taxes. The time effect is included to identify the trend 
over time. We used aid allocations by bilateral and multilateral donors as independent 
variable, including further disaggregation into grants and loans. As control variables used 
are the degree of openness of the economy and the development status.  
 All independent variables are introduced in analysis after centering to average, with 
exception of Time that is centered at the beginning of the time series (1990). The intercept 
can thus be interpreted directly as the initial status, e.g. the average value of tax revenues in 
1990. The β coefficient of Time can be interpreted as the growth rate from one year to 
another. The coefficients of the other predictors can be interpreted as the effect on the 
initial status (from 1990) of the dependent variable. The interactions between Time and Aid 
test for significant effects of aid on the growth rate of taxation. 
Several models were computed, introducing variables one by one and testing for 
improvement in model fit. For each dependent variable (total tax / indirect tax / direct tax as 
a % of gross national expenditures) several combinations of the substantive predictor (aid 
per capita) were used. In addition to using yearly aid data, we included lagged aid (with 1, 2 
and 3 years average) as explanatory variable. Moreover, the differentiation by type of aid 
(multi/bilateral and loans vs. grants) permits us to get closer insights in the specific effect of 
aid modalities on domestic taxation. Figure 3 and 4 provide general insight in the 
development of taxation rates and aid per capita over time. 
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Table 2: Total taxes as share of GNE (1990-2007) 
 
 
Table 3: Total donor Aid per capita (1990-2007) 
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We conducted three types of data analysis. First, we estimates the panel regression models 
with different specifications, starting with an uncontrolled growth model (only intercept and 
time) and then gradually introducing aid (with 1-3 years time lag)6, interaction terms 
between aid and time (growth rates) and control variables for the structure of the economy 
(openness) and the degree of development. We report coefficient estimates (at different 
significant levels) and robust standard errors. In addition, we include variance and goodness 
of fit parameters. Second, we computed predicted values for tax revenues of some selected 
models specifications and plotted these on time for different levels of country development 
and by the level of aid received, compared to actual tax performance, to further test the 
robustness of model performance. Third, we took a closer look at the time pattern of tax 
revenues and analyzed whether or not differences in tax rates can be attributed to changes 
in aid modalities.  
 
4.1. Total Tax Revenues and Aid 
Table 4a/b analyses total tax revenues (as % gross national expenditures) against total aid 
per capita (from all donors).  In 1990 average tax revenue as share of gross national 
expenditure are 12.12 %.. The annual growth rate is 0.14, implying that till the end of the 
time series (in 2007) the average tax revenues in gross national expenditure increased with 
2,38%. 
Effects of aid can be traced as follows: a 1 $ increase in per capita aid in the year prior to the 
year when total tax revenue was measured increases the initial status of dependent variable 
with 0.008%. A 1 $ increase in per capita aid for 2 years earlier increases the initial status of 
tax revenue with 0.015% and a 1 $ increase in per capita 3 years earlier increases the initial 
status of tax revenue with 0.017%. This implies that higher levels of aid sustained for longer 
periods of time tend to increase the initial status of tax revenues.7 
More interesting are the effects of aid on the growth rate within the time range investigated. 
As can be seen in models B1 and B2, total aid per capita one years prior and two years prior 
does not significantly influence the growth rate of total tax revenues. However, Model B3 and 
indicates that total aid per capita with 3 years lagged shows a significant impact on the 
growth rate (but not on initial status). Models C1, C2 and C3 are the final specifications 
including controls that are proposed for modelling the effect of total aid per capita from all 
donors on the level of tax revenues as % GNE. The results found in previous models are 
stable. 
                                               
6 We also disaggregated EU aid and total aid from all donors to infer differences between donors. On 
average, aid incidence on domestic taxation is slightly higher for EU donors.  
7 However, we should mention the problem of causality here: countries that received higher levels of 
aid could have had already higher rates of tax revenues prior to start. This result does not necessarily 
mean that higher levels of aid per capita directly cause higher level of tax revenues. 
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The graphical representations of predicted values of the results of these analyses indicate 
that there the model fits well, even while there is the possibility of a structural break point 
around year 1998 (see Figure 4). Mean predicted values for each time point and for countries 
with different levels of development show some differences in initial status and growth 
curves (see Figure 5). We also divided total aid 3-year lagged averaged into categorical 
variable, and plotted the predicted values calculated. Countries with different level of aid 
have different growth trajectories of taxation over time (see Figure 6). As can be seen, after 
year 2000 the total tax revenues as GNE share increases mainly for lower upper and middle 
income countries, while in previous periods they maintained different growth curves. This 
sustains the possibility of a structural break around the end of the 1990s. 
Figure 4: Total tax revenues (predicted and real) 
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Figure 5: Predicted total tax revenues for countries by development level 
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted total tax revenues by level of aid disbursements 
 
 
4.2 Total tax revenues: comparing bilateral and multilateral aid  
Table 5a/b presents the result of the analysis regarding the differential impact of bilateral or 
multilateral aid on domestic taxation. In addition to the basic model, several lagged 
specifications of bi/multilateral aid and interaction terms are included. 
The final results (presented in model specifications D to F) generally support the previous 
outcomes. Most importantly, only bilateral aid from DAC countries has a significant impact 
on the initial status of total tax revenues as % GNE. Results vary strongly between types of 
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countries. The results on the effect on lagged aid on the tax growth rate are rather 
inconclusive.  
4.3 Total tax revenues: comparing grants and loans 
Table 6a/b presents the result of the analysis regarding the differential impact of loans or 
grants on domestic taxation. In addition to the basic model, several lagged specifications of 
loans/grants and interaction terms are included. 
Final results (model specifications G to I) generally support the before outlined tendencies. In 
addition, only grants have a sustainable impact on the initial status of tax revenues as % 
GNE. Interestingly, however, the effect of 3-years lagged grants on the tax growth rate also 
obtained a significant effect on the growth rate.  This might indicate that there is an 
important long-term effect of aid grants on domestic tax regimes. 
4.4. Comparing Direct and Indirect taxation 
Table 7 and 8 provide some more detailed estimates for the different effects on direct and 
indirect taxation. Results show that there is no significant effect of time on direct tax 
revenues as % GNE. Comparing mean predicted and observed values per year we notice 
strong shifts and thus large variability over time. The effect of aid variables is generally not 
significant.  
The growth rates of indirect taxation is significant over time, indicating that there is a 
general tendency towards increased reliance on indirect tax raising. However, the aid 
variables do not gave any significant effect either on the initial status nor on the growth rate 
of indirect tax revenues as % GNE. When looking at the plotted predicted values for different 
categories of countries, it appears that there are hardly any differences in indirect taxation 
trends between countries receiving much or little development aid.  
Figure 7: Direct taxes by country           Figure 7b: Indirect taxes by country 
     development level             development level 
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Table 4a: Total tax revenues as % gross national expenditure  
 
Uncontrolled 
growth model Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model B1 Model B2 
Fixed effects coeff. std.e coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.12*** 0.76 12.08*** 0.78 12.09*** 0.78 12.09*** 0.78 12.09*** 0.78 12.14*** 0.78 
 Time (rate of change) 0.14** 0.05 0.14** 0.06 0.14** 0.05 0.14** 0.05 0.14** 0.06 0.14** 0.06 
Aid Total aid p.c. 1 year lag     0.008** 0.003         0.006 0.005     
 Total aid p.c. 2  years lag         0.015*** 0.004         0.006 0.006 
 Total aid p.c. 3 years lag              0.017*** 0.005         
 Total aid p.c. 1 year lag *Time                 0.0003 0.0006     
 Total aid p.c. 2  years lag *Time                     0.001 0.0008 
 Total aid p.c. 3  years lag * Time                         
Controls openness economy                         
 least developed (ref)                         
 low income                         
 lower middle                          
 upper middle                         
Variance components  
Level 1 within countries 3.16   2.85   2.83   2.83   2.84   2.8   
Level 2 In initial status 36.85   38.17   38.01   37.94   38.23   38.22   
 In the rate of change 0.19   0.21   0.21   0.21   0.21   0.21   
Goodness of fit  
  - 2LL 3745.22   3573.09   3572.37   3572.47   3572.85   3569.28   
 AIC 3757.22   3587.09   3586.37   3586.47   3588.85   3585.2   
 BIC 3785.41   3619.76   619.05   3619.14   3626.19   3622.6   
Note: Lagged variable computed per capita and centered at average value 
*** - significant for .01; ** - significant for .05; * - significant for .10 
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Table 4b: Total tax revenues as % gross national expenditure (continued) 
 
 Model B2 Model B3 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.14*** 0.78 12.18*** 0.78 9.77*** 1.18 9.73*** 1.17 9.86*** 1.19 
 Time (rate of change) 0.14** 0.06 0.14** 0.06 0.11* 0.06 0.11* 0.05 0.11* 0.05 
Aid Total aid p.c. 1 year lag         0.007* 0.004         
 Total aid p.c. 2  years lag 0.006 0.006         0.01*** 0.004     
 Total aid p.c. 3 years lag      0.0005 0.008             
 Total aid p.c. 1 year lag *Time                     
 Total aid p.c. 2  years lag *Time 0.001 0.0008                 
 Total aid p.c. 3  years lag * Time     0.003*** 0.0009         0.003*** 0.0006 
Controls openness economy         0.02*** 0.006 0.02*** 0.006 0.02*** 0.006 
 least developed (ref)                     
 low income         2.77 1.78 2.79 1.78 2.65 1.8 
 lower middle          3.71** 1.44 3.74** 1.44 3.61** 1.46 
 upper middle         4.86*** 1.79 5.05*** 1.79 5.03*** 1.81 
Variance components  
Level 1 within countries 2.8   2.76   2.86   2.85   2.78   
Level 2 In initial status 38.22   38.37   30.7   30.49   31.36   
 In the rate of change 0.21   0.23   0.18   0.18   0.19   
Goodness of fit 
  - 2LL 3569.28   3564.01   3552.12   3551.67   3544.71   
 AIC 3585.2   3580.01   3574.12   3573.67   3566.71   
 BIC 3622.6   3617.36   3625.46   3625.02   3618.06   
Note: Lagged variable computed per capita and centered at average value 
*** - significant for .01; ** - significant for .05; * - significant for .10 
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Table 5a: Total tax revenues as % gross national expenditure - bilateral & Multilateral aid 
  
Uncontrolled growth 
model Model D1  Model D2  Model D3  Model E1 
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.12*** 0.76 12.2*** 0.78 12.22*** 0.77 12.21*** 0.77 12.18*** 0.78 
 Time (rate of change) 0.14** 0.05 0.13** 0.06 0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.06 
Aid Bilateral aid 1 year lag    0.01** 0.004         0.01** 0.006 
 Multilateral aid 1 year lag    0.006*** 0.003         -0.001 0.01 
 Bilateral aid 2  years lag        0.02*** 0.005         
 Multilateral aid 2  years lag        0.008 0.006         
 Bilateral aid 3  years lag            0.02* 0.006     
 Multilateral  aid 3  years lag            0.008 0.008     
 Bilateral aid 1 year lag *Time                -0.0003 0.0006 
 Multilateral aid 1 year lag *Time                0.0005 0.0007 
 Bilateral aid 2  years lag * Time                    
 Multilateral aid 2 years lag * Time                    
 Bilateral aid 3  years lag * Time                    
 Multilateral aid 3 years lag * Time                    
Controls openness economy                    
Dev. Stage low income                    
 lower middle                     
 upper middle                    
Variance components                    
Level 1 within countries 3.16  2.81   2.78   2.79   2.81   
Level 2 In initial status 36.85  38.2   37.42   37.09   37.93   
 In the rate of change 0.19  0.21   0.21   0.2   0.21   
Goodness of fit    
  - 2LL 3745.22  3559.94   3552.04   3553.42   3559.16   
 AIC 3757.22  3575.94   3568.04   3569.42   3579.16   
 BIC 3785.41   3613.26   3605.37   3606.74   3625.81   
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Table 5b: Total tax revenues as % gross national expenditure - bilateral & Multilateral aid (Continued) 
  Model E2 Model E3 Model F1 Model F2 Model F3 
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er coeff. std.er coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.23*** 0.77 12.24*** 0.77 9.91*** 1.18 9.88*** 1.17 9.88*** 1.16 
 Time (rate of change) 0.13** 0.05 0.13** 0.06 0.1* 0.05 0.1* 0.05 0.1* 0.05 
Aid Bilateral aid 1 year lag         0.009** 0.004         
 Multilateral aid 1 year lag         0.006* 0.003         
 Bilateral aid 2  years lag 0.02*** 0.008         0.02*** 0.005     
 Mutilateral aid 2  years lag -0.01 0.01         0.009 0.006     
 Bilateral aid 3  years lag     0.02* 0.01         0.02*** 0.006 
 Multilateral  aid 3  years lag     -0.02 0.02         0.01 0.008 
 Bilateral aid 1 year lag *Time                     
 Multilateral aid 1 year lag *Time                     
 Bilateral aid 2  years lag * Time -0.0001 0.0009                 
 Multilateral aid 2 years lag * Time 0.001* 0.001                 
 Bilateral aid 3  years lag * Time     0.001 0.001             
 Multilateral aid 3 years lag * Time     0.002 0.001             
Controls openness economy         0.02*** 0.006 0.02*** 0.006 0.02*** 0.006 
Dev. Stage low income         2.7 1.78 2.71 1.77 2.72 1.77 
 lower middle          3.7** 1.44 3.72** 1.43 3.73** 1.43 
 upper middle         4.9*** 1.78 5.05*** 1.78 5.08*** 1.77 
Variance components  
Level 1 within countries 2.77   2.76   2.82       2.8   
Level 2 In initial status 36.96   37.01   30.82       29.75   
 In the rate of change 0.2   0.21   0.18       0.17   
Goodness of fit     
  - 2LL 3548.83   3547.98   3538.29   3530.85   3531.83   
 AIC 3568.83   3567.98   3562.29   3554.85   3555.83   
 BIC 3615.49   3614.63   3618.28   3610.84   3611.82   
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Table 6a:  Total tax revenues as % of Gross National Expenditures - Loans & Grants 
  
Uncontrolled growth 
model  Model G1  Model G2  Model G3  Model H1  
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.12*** 0,76 12.19*** 0,78 12.24*** 0,77 12.21*** 0,77 12.19*** 0,78 
 Time (rate of change) 0.14** 0,05 0.13** 0,06 0.13* 0,05 0.13** 0,05 0.13** 0,06 
Aid Total grants 1 year lag    0.009*** 0,003         0,008 0,006 
 Total loans 1 year lag    0,003 0,004         0,005 0,009 
 Total grants 2  years lag        0.02*** 0,004         
 Total loans 2  years lag        0,005 0,006         
 Total grants 3  years lag            0.02*** 0,005     
 Total loans 3  years lag            0,007 0,007     
 Total grants 1 year lag *Time                0,0002 0,0006 
 Total loans 1 year lag *Time                -0,0001 0,0008 
 Total grants 2  years lag * Time                    
 Total loans 2  years lag * Time                    
 Total grants 3  years lag * Time                    
 Total loans 3  years lag * Time                    
Controls openness economy                    
Dev. Stage low income                    
 lower middle                     
 upper middle                    
Variance components  
Level 1 within countries 3,16  2,84   2,81   2,82   2,83   
Level 2 In initial status 36,85  37,45   37,18   37,28   37,54   
 In the rate of change 0,19  0,21   0,2   0,21   0,21   
Goodness of fit 
  - 2LL 3745,22  3569,36   3566,45   3568,4   3569,22   
 AIC 3757,22  3585,36   3582,45   3584,4   3589,22   
 BIC 3785,41   3622,69   3619,8   3621,7   3635,89   
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Table 6b:  Total tax revenues as % of Gross National Expenditures - Loans & Grants (continued) 
  Model H2 Model H3 Model I1 Model I2 Model I3 
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite model Intercept (initial status) 12.27*** 0,78 12.25*** 0,78 9.86*** 1,17 9.81*** 1,17 9.87*** 1,18 
 Time (rate of change) 0.13** 0,06 0.13** 0,06 0.1* 0,05 0.1* 0,05 0.1* 0,05 
Aid Total grants 1 year lag        0.009*** 0,003         
 Total loans 1 year lag        0,003 0,004         
 Total grants 2  years lag 0,01 0,008        0.02*** 0,004     
 Total loans 2  years lag -0,003 0,01        0,006 0,006     
 Total grants 3  years lag     0,004 0,009         0,004 0,009 
 Total loans 3  years lag     -0,002 0,01         0.02** 0,008 
 Total grants 1 year lag#*Time                    
 Total loans 1 year lag#*Time                    
 Total grants 2  years lag * Time 0,0009 0,0008                
 Total loans 2  years lag * Time 0,001 0,001                
 Total grants 3  years lag * Time    0.002** 0,0009         0.002** 0,0008 
 Total loans 3  years lag * Time     0,002 0,001             
Controls openness economy        0.02*** 0,006 0.02*** 0,006 0.02*** 0,006 
 least developed (ref)                    
 low income        2,78 1,78 2,82 1,78 2,68 1,79 
 lower middle         3.73** 1,44 3.78*** 1,43 3.68** 1,44 
 upper middle        4.85*** 1,78 5.05*** 1,78 5.02*** 1,79 
Variance components 
Level 1 within countries 2,79   2,76  2,85   2,83   2,8   
Level 2 In initial status 37,37   37,88  30,31   30,12   30,74   
 In the rate of change 0,21   0,22  0,18   0,17   0,19   
Goodness of fit            
  - 2LL 3564,75   3562,28  3548,95   3547,1   3544,31   
 AIC 3584,75   3582,28  3572,95   3571,1   3570,31   
 BIC 3631,43   3628,96   3628,95   3627,12   3631   
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Table 7: Direct tax revenues as % gross national expenditure 
 
Uncontrolled growth 
model  Model A1 Model A2  Model A3  Model B1  Model B2  Model B3  
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite 
model Intercept (initial status) 3.5*** 0.68 3.49*** 0.7 3.49*** 0.7 3.49*** 0.7 2.23*** 0.86 2.23*** 0.86 2.23*** 0.86 
 Time (rate of change) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Aid Total aid 1 year lag     -0.002 0.003         -0.002 0.003         
 Total aid 2  years lag         -0.002 0.004         -0.003 0.004     
 Total aid 3  years lag             -0.003 0.004         -0.003 0.004 
 Total aid 1 year lag *Time                             
 Total aid 2  years lag * Time                             
 Total aid 3  years lag * Time                             
Controls openess economy                 0.01*** 0.005 0.01* 0.005 0.01* 0.005 
 least developed (ref)                             
 low income                 0.82 0.99 0.83 0.99 0.83 0.99 
 lower middle                  2.17*** 0.8 2.17*** 0.8 2.17*** 0.8 
 upper middle                 3*** 1 3*** 1.01 2.99*** 1 
Variance components                             
Level 1 within countries 2.54   2.61   2.6   2.61   2.62   2.61   2.61   
Level 2 In initial status 28.68   29.47   29.47   29.47   27.08   27.06   27.06   
 In the rate of change 0.11   0.11   0.11   0.11   0.1   0.1   0.1   
Goodness of fit 
  - 2LL 3426.49   3338.47   3341.6   3341.57   3322.5   3325.7   3325.69   
 AIC 3438.49   3352.47   3355.6   3355.57   3344.5   3347.7   3347.69   
 BIC 3466.62   385.06   3388.2   3388.16   3395.71   3398.92   3398.92   
Note: Lagged variable computed per capita and centered at average value 
*** - significant for .01; ** - significant for .05; * - significant for .10 
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Table 8: Indirect tax revenues as % gross national expenditure 
  
Uncontrolled growth 
model  Model A1  Model A2  Model A3  Model B1  Model B2  Model B3  
Fixed effects  coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. coeff. std.er. 
Composite 
model Intercept (initial status) 4.14*** 0.51 4*** 0.53 4.02*** 0.53 4.02*** 0.53 1.89*** 0.72 1.86** 0.72 1.87** 0.72 
 Time (rate of change) 0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 0.17*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.05 
Aid Total aid 1 year lag#     0.0001 0.002         0.0004 0.002         
 Total aid 2  years lag         0.003 0.003         0.003 0.003     
 Total aid 3  years lag             0.002 0.004         0.002 0.004 
 Total aid 1 year lag *Time                             
 Total aid 2  years lag * Time                             
 Total aid 3  years lag * Time                             
Controls openness economy                 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 
 least developed (ref)                             
 low income                 2.74*** 0.87 2.75*** 0.88 2.75*** 0.88 
 lower middle                  2.54*** 0.73 2.58*** 0.73 2.58*** 0.73 
 upper middle                 3.69*** 0.88 3.8*** 0.89 3.78*** 0.89 
Variance components                             
Level 1 within countries 2.01   1.93   1.93   1.93   1.94   1.93   1.94   
Level 2 In initial status 15.39   15.87   16.28   16.25   15.14   15.5   15.48   
 In the rate of change 0.15   0.15   0.15   0.15   0.15   0.15   0.15   
Goodness of fit  
  - 2LL 3264.77   3140.9   3145.6   3145.99   3120.77   3125.29   3125.71   
 AIC 3276.77   3154.9   3159.6   3159.99   3142.77   3147.29   3147.71   
 BIC 3304.88   3187.47   3192.2   3192.56   3193.94   3198.47   3198.89   
Note: Lagged variable computed per capita and centered at average value 
*** - significant for .01; ** - significant for .05; * - significant for .10 
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5. Discussion & Outlook 
 
While most earlier studies on the relationship between development aid and domestic 
taxation focused attention on the implications for economic growth and income distribution, 
we used the tax share in gross domestic expenditures (GNE) as dependent variable, thus 
enabling more thorough insights in the internal contribution of tax revenues to the public 
budget. On average, taxes cover about 14% of GNE, but the tax contribution is substantially 
higher in East Asian and Latin American countries, whereas South Asia and sub-Saharan 
countries maintain lower tax rates and a variable growth pattern. Indirect taxes prevail in 
most developing countries as a major source of internal funding.  
The estimation results provide robust evidence that for the positive and significant effect of 
development aid on domestic tax revenues, while the effect becomes substantially stronger 
2-3 years after aid disbursements.  The crowding-out hypothesis is thus not registered. The 
tax effect of aid is stronger for bilateral aid (compared to multilateral aid), for grants 
(compared to loans) and for middle income countries. Differences between direct and 
indirect taxation could not be confirmed.  
The panel data analysis also reveals that the tax share in GNE has been steadily declining 
during the 1990s period, while from the year 1998 onwards the tax contribution started to 
increase from an average of 13% to more than 16 % of GNE. This is remarkable, even more 
considering the fact that aid per capita also increased in the same period. The most likely 
cause is that the shift from project aid to budget support programs obliged many developing 
countries' governments to better guarantee domestic counterpart funding (Koeberle et al., 
2006). In some countries an increase in tax revenue is even part of the agreement between 
the government and the donors. Harmonizing of donor practices also reduces the oppor-
tunities for using donor aid from one agency to cover local contributions required by another 
agency.  There are therefore sound reasons to expect that aid in the form of general budget 
support enhances the incentives for the developmental state to raise local tax-raising 
contributions to the public budget.
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Annex 1: Data Sources 
World Bank, World Development Indicators online 
- Total tax revenue ( % GDP / % of Government Expenditures) 
o Indirect tax revenues: Taxes on goods and services (% revenue) 
o Direct tax revenues: Taxes on incomes, profits and capital gains (% revenue) 
- Agriculture value added (% of GDP) 
- Industry added value (% of GDP) 
- Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
- Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
- Revenues (excluding grants) as % GDP 
- Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 
- Ore and metal exports (% of merchandise exports 
- Population 
- Population density 
- Rural population (% of total population) 
- Gini Index 
- Employment in agriculture sector as % total labour force 
OECD-DAC , Foreign Aid variables 
- All donors: Total aid from all donors sent to a country (grants & loans) 
- DAC EU countries: Total aid from DAC EU countries sent to a country (grants & loans) 
- Categories of development: 1 (least developed countries) 2 (other low income countries) 3 (lower middle 
income countries) 4 (upper middle income countries)  
- Initial country list followed OECD DAC list 2006, excluding countries categorized by United Nation as Small 
islands developing states. Resulting list consisted of 108 DAC countries 
World Bank list of economies 
- By Geographical region: 1 (South Asia) 2 (Europe & Central Asia) 3 (Africa) 4 (Sub Saharan Africa) 5 (Latin 
America and Caribbean) 6 (East Asia and Pacific) 
Time interval and computed variables 
The time interval of the study ranges from 1990 to 2007 (due to lack of data on tax revenues prior to 1990 and to 
changes in the OECD DAC list that occurred from 2008). The dataset is not balanced, since not all countries have 
observations on all time points for the dependent variables (tax revenues).  
Computed variables are: 
- Ratio of agriculture added value to industrial added value.  
- Openness of the economy – sum of imports and exports shares in GDP.  
- Mineral exports – sum of fuel and ore / metals exports as % of merchandised exports. 
- Development aid per capita – all development aid divided by the population of a country; 
After initial analysis we concluded that using development aid data from the same year as the tax revenues data 
leads to misspecification of the model. We thus used lagged aid – one year prior to the year when tax revenue is 
measured, and conducted robustness checks for 2 and 3 years lagged aid.  
Data file structure 
The datafile is stored as country – period dataset. Initial working dataset has 1386 cases (18 time points nested in 
77 countries).  Missing cases were deleted. 
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Annex 2: Taxation rates and tax structures (by countries and region) 
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Annex 3: Total Tax Revenues as share of GDP (by country & region) 
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Annex 4: Tax Revenues as share of GNE 
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